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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF OCCUPIERS’ 
LIABILITY TO TRESPASSERS
William Ian Innest
That branch of tort law dealing with the liability of occupiers 
to persons injured on their premises has long been regarded as 
one of the least satisfactory areas of the common law. Nowhere 
is this more glaring than in the titular justice which the law has 
afforded injured trespassers. Until 1972, the definitive formulation 
of the law was that laid down by Lord Hailsham, L.C., in Addie  
v. D um breck1 where liability was limited to “some act done with 
a deliberate intention of doing harm to the trespasser, or at least 
some act done with reckless disregard of [ his] presence.” No lesser 
personage than Lord Diplock has termed this doctrine “draco­
nian.”2
Professor Fleming has attributed this development to the great 
importance attached to proprietary rights during the formative 
period of the common law.3 He goes on to suggest that social 
change has so far out-stepped the law’s preoccupation with property 
as to render the existing state of the law painfully obsolete. On the 
one hand we have the 1932 Atkinian formulation of a general tor­
tious duty based on proximity and forseeability; on the other, a 1929 
decision of the House of Lords which entrenched the concept that 
landholding could  be a ground for immunity in tort. Professor 
Fleming has called for “radical reform" to resolve the tension 
between these two “warring social philosophies”.4
A d d ie ’s5 case gave definition and authority to earlier juris­
prudence restricting the relief available to an injured trespasser. 
In the face of a particularly gruesome accident where a small boy 
was crushed to death, the House denied recovery to the child’s 
parents and re-stated the orthodox formulation of the law. This
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dampened widespread hopes that the law might be humanized,6 
fostered “smouldering resentm ent”7 in Scotland where the case 
originated, and has provoked academic outrage ever since. The 
rule enunciated required actual knowledge of presence of the 
trespasser in the case of “reckless disregard” and operated irre­
spective of the age or capacity of the entrant: “it is hard to see 
how infantile temptations can give rights, however much they 
may excuse peccadiloes.”H
This was hard law and has given rise to a good deal of involved 
jurisprudence aimed at ameliorating its obvious severity. The 
major judicial constructs in this area have been imputed license,4 
the “allurement” doctrine,10 the distinction between active and 
static conditions of land,11 the distinction between the liability of 
occupiers and contractors not in occupation of the land,12 and 
finally the distinction between trespass to land and trespass to 
vehicles or installations on land.13 The greatest challenge to the 
authority of Addie came from Lord Denning M.R. in Videan v. 
B T C H and a series of three ju d g m en ts  in the High Court of 
Australia: Thompson v. Bankstown Corp.;15 Rich v. Comr. fo r  
Rys. ;16 and Comr. fo r  Rys. v. Cardy. 17 In essence, these cases 
were attempts to out-flank Addie and leave it subject to an over­
riding test of reasonable care. The jurisprudential machinations 
involved are now of only academic interest as the Privy Council 
in Comr. fo r  Rys. v. Quin tin'" quashed any suggestion that the 
Addie  case could be subject to a Donoghue v. Stevenson19 gloss. 
Although The Occupiers’ Liability A c t (Scotland) 1960 extended 
a common duty of care to all entrants, divided opinion in the
6 Herrington. (1972) 1 All E.R. 749, 787-e p e r  Lord Diplock.
7 Fleming, loc. cit. n. 4.
8 Lotham  v. Johnson and N ephew  Ltd. [19131 1 K.B. 398, 415 p e r  Hamilton, 
L.J. cited in North, O ccu p iers’ Liability, London. Butterworths, 1971, at 
page 169.
9 North, op. cit. p. 165 e t seq.
10 Glasgow Corpn. v. Taylor. [19221 A.C. 44.
11 M ourton  v. Poulton. [ 1930] 2 K.B. 183.
12 Fleming, op. cit. p. 407.
13 Street. The Law o f  Torts, 5th Ed. p. 193.
14 [19631 2 All. E.R. 860.
15 (1952), 87 C.L.R. 619.
16 (1959), 101 C.L.R. 135.
17 (1960), 104 C.L.R. 274.
18 11964) A.C. 1054.
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Law Reform Committee Report of 1954 left the English law regard­
ing occupiers’ liability for trespassers unchanged.
When B.R.B. v. Herrington20 came before the House of Lords 
they found the law torn between academic outcry, a confused 
legislative posture, and decades of gloss and invention stemming 
from the Addie  decision and earlier case law. Taking full advan­
tage of the flexibility allowed by the 1966 Practice D irection,21 the 
House made a major alteration in the state of the law. Acting on 
the basis of this decision in Veinot v. Kerr-Addison Mines Lim it­
e d 22 the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have worked the 
radical reform which Professor Fleming called for.
I. The H ERRING TO N  Decision
The defendant corporation operated an electrified railway 
track separating two park areas frequented by children. The track 
was fenced, and at one spot there was a footbridge leading over 
the track. At one location the fence had fallen to within a few 
inches of the ground. The evidence showed that this condition 
had existed for some time and had been in use as a short-cut by 
members of the public. The six year old plaintiff who had been 
playing with his brothers, wandered off, went through the gap in 
the fence and was severely injured by the electrified rail. There 
was evidence that the defendant Board had knowledge both of 
the presence of children along the line in that area before, and of 
the defective condition of the fence at points in that stretch of 
railway. The defendant chose to adduce no evidence and relied 
strictly on the Addie  decision.
The Court of Appeal21 concluded, in a very involved decision, 
that the co n d u c t of the defendant Board had been such as to 
amount to recklessness in law. It thus upheld a trial award which 
seemed to have been based on a finding of simple negligence. 
The House rejected both of these tacts, and dealt with the case 
on the footing that this is a clear case of a child trespasser unable 
to rely on either licence or allurement. The stage was thus set 
for a direct confrontation with the Addie  decision, with the excep­
tion that the plaintiff in Addie  had had a stronger case on the 
facts.
Lord Reid examined the facts and the state of the law in the 
wake of Addie. If that decision were to stand, he concluded, the
20 (1972) 1 All E.R. 749.
21 See A.L. Goodhart's N ote . 88 Law 0 -  Rev.. 310, 314.
22 (Oct. 9, 1974 — as yet unreported).
23 [1971] 1 All E.R. 897.
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only duty of the defendant Board: “was a humanitarian duty not 
to act recklessly with regard to children whom they knew to be 
there.”24 He then turned to squarely face the growing social con­
cern for the welfare of child trespassers: “Legal principles cannot 
solve the problem. How far occupiers are to be required by law 
to safeguard such children must be a m atter of public policy.”25 
The term “reckless” from Addie  was useful in that it recognized 
that duty must vary with the knowledge, skill or resources of 
the occupier, but the term “culpable” was preferable.26 Since the 
relationship between trespasser and occupier was imposed by the 
former and not voluntarily assumed, the resulting duty must be 
less than a common duty of care. Lord Reid described it as a duty 
to act in a “humane m anner”.27 “So the question whether an 
occupier is liable in respect of an accident to a trespasser on his 
land would depend on whether a conscientious humane man with 
his knowledge, skill and resources could reasonably have been 
expected to have done or refrained from doing before the accident 
something which would have avoided it.”28
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest stated that on the facts adduced 
any normal person would conclude that the defendants were 
“grievously at fault”.29 “It must at any time be a m atter of regret 
and of concern if the answer of the law does not accord with the 
answer that common sense would suggest.”30 He then examined 
the early cases which laid down the rule that an occupier who 
deliberately sets traps for trespassers (e.g., spring guns) will be 
liable for injuries caused to such trespassers. One basis for that 
rule was that the placing of such traps was “contrary to the prin­
ciples of humanity”.31 Addie  had lost sight of that premise.32 
In the instant case there was: “a duty, which while not amounting 
to the duty of care which an occupier owes to a visitor, would 
be a duty to take such steps as common sense or common humanity 
would dictate; they would be steps calculated to exclude or to 
warn or otherwise within reasonable and practicable limits to 
reduce or avert danger.”33
24 11972) 1 All E.R. 749, 757-a.
25 Ib id ., p. 756-j.
26 Ibid., p. 758-c.
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Lord Wilberforce found that the case was one of an infant 
trespasser, pure and simple, faced with the “formidable author­
ity”34 of the Addie  case. Rather than discard that authority, he 
first attempted to: “see whether we can move on from the position 
taken in 1929 by classical methods of experience, analogy and 
logic.”35 The rules in the Addie  case, he concluded, were not 
exhaustive but “were expressive of certain consequences as re­
gards proximity and forseeability which flow from the given 
relationship (occupier and invitee-licensee-trespasser).”36 He 
spoke of the “narcotic preoccupation with the occupier-trespasser 
relationship.”37 He concluded that the Addie  rule expresses the 
narrow duty recognized when the only relevant circumstances 
are the occupier-trespasser distinction; once other relevant cir­
cumstances arise, this must give way to the general tortious 
theory of duty based on proximity and forseeability. To give rise 
to a greater duty, the presence of trespassers must be “extremely 
likely”.38 “What is reasonable depends on the nature and degree of 
the danger. It also depends on the difficulty and expense of guarding 
against it”.39 In most cases, the test of “recklessness” should give 
way to an analysis of the appropriate duty of care. He concluded: 
“I am not prepared, especially in view of the judge’s finding, to 
differ from your Lordships’ view that in relation to the special 
duty of care incumbent on the appellants in the relevant place, 
there was a breach of that duty amounting to legal negligence, 
but I am left with the feeling that cases such as these would be 
more satisfactorily dealt with by a modern system of public enter­
prise liability devised by Parliament.”40
Lord Pearson began his judgment by pointing out that to say 
that an occupier does not owe to a trespasser the same duty of 
care as he does to a lawful entrant is not to say that he owes no 
duty at all. “If the presence of the trespasser is known or reason­
ably to be anticipated . . .”41 then there exists “a duty to treat the 
trespasser with ordinary humanity.”42 The formulation in the 
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imposing liability for positive acts, as opposed to omissions,43 in 
requiring actual knowledge of the presence of trespassers,44 and 
in requiring “recklessness” rather than simple negligence.45 The 
truth was that Addie scase had been “rendered obsolete by changes 
in physical and social conditions and has become an encumbrance 
impeding the proper development of the law. With the increase of 
the population and the larger proportion living in cities and towns 
and the exhaustive substitution of blocks of flats for rows of 
houses with gardens or backyards and quiet streets, there is less 
playing space for children and so a greater temptation to trespass. 
Also with the progress of technology there are more and greater 
dangers for them to encounter by reason of the increased use of, 
for instance, electricity, gas, fast-moving vehicles, heavy machinery 
and poisonous chemicals.”46
Lord Diplock criticized the railway for declining to call wit­
nesses. “This is a legitimate tactical move under our adversarial 
system of litigation. But a defendant who adopts it cannot com­
plain if the court draws from the facts which have been disclosed 
all reasonable inferences as to what are the facts which the defen­
dant has chosen to withhold.”47 The existing state of danger would 
be recognized by “anyone of common sense.”48 In a surprising 
comment: “all nine judges who have been concerned with the in­
stant case in its various stages are convinced that the plaintiffs 
claim ought to succeed; and, if I may be permitted to be candid, 
are determined that it shall.”49 The authority of Addie's case 
must be discarded, and a new analysis formulated based on a 
general tortious concept of duty. There must be actual knowledge 
of the presence of a trespasser, or facts which make the presence 
of trespassers likely.so There must be actual knowledge of the 
condition of the land which gives rise to the danger. 51
Lord Diplock concludes: “The degree of likelihood needed to 
give rise to the duty cannot, I think, be more closely defined than 
as being such as would impel a man of ordinary humane feelings 
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to which the particular danger exposes him. It will thus depend on 
all the circumstances of the case: the permanent or intermittent 
character of the danger; the severity of the injuries which it is 
likely to cause; in the case of children, the attractiveness to them 
of that which constitutes the dangerous object or condition of 
the land; the expense involved in giving effective warning of it 
to the kind of trespasser likely to be injured, in relation to the 
occupier’s resources in money or in labour.”52
II. THE IMPACT OF HERRINGTON
Upon concluding an analysis of Herrington one is faced with 
the problem of determining whether that case outlines the rele­
vant considerations peculiar to the case of unlawful entrants in 
ascertaining the existence and extent of an Atkinian duty of care; 
or has the House of Lords, while mitigating the severity of the 
existing law, left this field separate and apart from the general 
application of principles of negligence. In other words, does the 
test of common sense or humanity equate with that of reasonable 
care? There are two major impediments to this proposition. The 
first lies in the extreme complexity of the Law Lords’ speeches. 
There can be no answer to this objection except that one must 
look to what other courts extract from the case as a practicable 
test. The second difficulty is that while most of the particularities 
found throughout these judgments can be categorized as dicta , 
there seems some basis for the requirement of a high probability 
of the presence of trespassers, independent of the other circum ­
stances, before the question of the existence of a duty will be en­
tertained. Both of these problems have already been the subject 
of judicial scrutiny.
Pannett v. McGuinness & Co.53 was the first reported case 
in the English Court of Appeal to consider Herrington. Previous 
authority was dismissed without discussion, and the Court found 
no difficulty approving a damage award on the authority of that 
case. While the rest of the Court was content to use the words of 
Herrington, Lord Denning, M.R., reduced them to a simple formula: 
“The long and short of it is that you have to take into account all 
the circumstances of the case and see then whether the occupier 
ought to have done more than he did.”54
52 Ibid., 7%-d to e.
53 [1972 ] 3 W.L.R. 386.
54 Ibid.. 390-g.
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The second problem appears to have been quite decisively 
resolved by the Privy Council in Southern Portland Cement Ltd. 
v. Cooper:5* “The only rational or practical answer would seem 
to be that the occupier is entitled to neglect a bare, possibility 
that trespassers may come to a particular place on his land but is 
bound at least to give consideration to the m atter when he knows 
facts that show a substantial chance that they may come there.” 
It must be remembered that three of the five judges in this case 
were present on the Herrington appeal: Lords Reid, Wilberforce, 
and Morris of Borth-y-Gest.
In M itchell v. C.N.R.,Sb the Supreme Court considered both 
Herrington and Pannett. The precise ratio of this case is difficult 
to determine, but as the court found the plaintiff to be a licensee, 
the discussion of the trespasser question must be termed obiter. 
Laskin, J., (as he then was) wrote in the majority opinion with ref­
erence to these cases: “I am less reluctant to find an actionable 
breach of a duty of care in the present case when I consider how 
broadly other courts in sister jurisdictions have viewed the duty 
owing by an occupier to children, even where they are classified 
as trespassers.”51 Ritchie, J., in his dissent felt that Herrington 
could not be treated as changing the law of Canada. In a recent 
decision of Killeen, Co. Ct. J., in Lynch v. Brewers Warehousing 
Co. Ltd.,™ he wrote: “As I consider the Mitchell case, it goes 
beyond the param eters of the celebrated English case of British 
Railways Board v. Herrington, and adopts the “foreseeability” test 
as propounded by Lord Denning, M.R., in Videanetal. v. B.T.C . ”59 
It is submitted that the learned judge erred in over-estimating the 
strength of the M itchell decision, although in point of fact his con­
clusion as to the state of the law was probably correct.
It is in the as yet unreported decision of the Supreme Court in 
Peter Veniot v. Kerr-Addison Mines Limited  (Oct. 9, 1974), that 
the law of Canada emerged, so to speak, from the judicial crucible. 
The adult plaintiff in this case was injured when driving his snow­
mobile in the dark (with necessary lights) along a private road 
ow ned by the d e fen d an t co rp o ra tio n . He s tru ck  a rusty 
pipe stretched across the road at face level: this pipe was sup­
ported by unpainted posts located off the road and was intended 
to block access to the company’s powder magazine. There was
55 11974) 2 W.L.R. 152. 163-h, p e r  Lord Reid.
56 (1972), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 44<).
57 Ibid., 45().
58 (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 677.
59 Ibis., 681.
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evidence that the road, to the company’s knowledge, was in use 
by snowmobilers, and also that such traffic was most common at 
night. There was evidence of a warning sign (though not a warning 
of the precise danger) at an entrance to the road. The plaintiff 
was going at a very moderate speed (15-20 m.p.h.). The jury found 
that he was present with the implicit permission of the defendant 
corporation, that the pipe constituted a concealed or hidden dan­
ger or trap, and finally that the accident resulted from a lack of 
reasonable care on the part of the defendant. On this basis they 
awarded damages to the plaintiff. The Ontario Court of Appeal60 
reversed the trial decision, holding that there was no implicit 
licence. Further they found that there was not a sufficient proba­
bility of the presence of trespassers to allow recovery under the 
Herrington rule.
In a mixed decision, the Supreme Court restored the trial 
award. Dickson, J., Laskin, C.J., and Spence, JM concurring) re­
viewed all the recent case law. At page 4 of his judgment he 
cites the statement of Lord Denning, M.R., in Pannett which was 
cited supra as “aptly expressfing]” the correct judicial approach. 
He further cites the Cooper case as authority for abandoning the 
“extreme likelihood” test. He concluded that the Ontario Court 
of Appeal should not have interfered with the jury’s finding of 
license, as there were sufficient facts before them to allow them 
to reach that conclusion. He went on, however, to conclude that 
Mr. Veinot was entitled, even as a trespasser, to succeed: “Al­
though as a general rule a person is not bound to anticipate the 
presence of intruders on private property or to guard them from 
injury, a duty may arise if the owner of the land knew of, or from 
all the surrounding circumstances ought reasonably to have fore­
seen, the presence of a trespasser.”61 Pigeon, J., with whom Beetz, 
J., concurred, preferred to decide the m atter in favour of the plain­
tiff on the basis of licence, without expressing an opinion as to 
the other point.
In a strong dissent, Martland, J., (Judson, Ritchie and de 
G randpre, J.J., concurring) would have dismissed the appeal. He 
agreed with the Court of Appeal that the finding of license was 
perverse. He then went on to examine the recent case law to de­
termine whether the plaintiff could succeed as a trespasser. After 
a thorough review of the cases, he concluded that the Herrington 
decision must not be seen as basing the duty of an occupier on the 
Donoghue v. Stevenson principle. He cites passages in Cooper 
indicating that the law must not allow the duty towards a tres­
60 [1973] 1 O.R. 411.
61 Judgment of D ickson J., p. 9-10.
48 U. N. B. LA W  JOURNA L
passer to exceed that towards a licensee. He seems however to 
accept the decision of Lord Reid to discard the test of “extreme 
likelihood”. He concludes: “The effect of these cases might be 
summarized as being that an occupier who knows of the existence 
of a danger upon his land which he has created, or for whose con­
tinued existence he is responsible, may owe a duty to persons 
coming on his land, of whose presence he is not aware, if he knows 
facts which show a substantial chance that they might come there. 
This is, in essence, the duty stated by Dixon C.J. in the Cardy 
case. Such duty, when it exists, is limited in the case of adults, to 
a duty to warn. In the case of children something more may be 
required. The existence of a duty will depend on the special cir­
cumstances of each case.” In the instant case there had been no 
breach of a duty amounting to legal negligence.
Thus, one can safely conclude that, in one form or another, 
Herrington’s case is now the law of Canada. One must then return 
to the problem of exactly what that case decides.
III. CONCLUSION
One might be tempted to conclude, as have some writers,62 
that while Herrington may well have largely mitigated the severity 
of the law, it has by no means put an end to the confusion sur­
rounding it. The case law seems full of alternate tests: common 
sense and humanity or reasonable care; substantial probability of 
the presence of trespassers or foreseeable presence; as regards 
adult trespassers, the use of warning devices, or precautions rea­
sonable in the circumstances. It is submitted that this complexity 
is illusory, that ultimately this is a question of distinction without 
difference. To reach the conclusion, one must turn to consider the 
policy problem these difficulties reflect.
In Canada, the courts are still saddled with the cumbersome 
common law rules of occupiers’ liability. To allow trespassers a 
greater protection than lawful entrants would be absurd, not only 
because of the theoretical inconsistency, but also because com­
mon sense militates against this conclusion. This is because the 
reasonable man would be expected to take greater precautions to 
safeguard those expected to be on his land than those not expected. 
Thus the category of entrant bears on proximity and the corres­
ponding tort duty; the more improbable the entrant, the less the 
duty. The common law of occupiers’ liability recognizes this con­
cept, but in a very primitive fashion. Decades of judicial legis­
lation have served to sever these rules from the perceptions which 
gave rise to them.
62 See: 88Law 0 -  Rev. 310 and 456 , U.B.C . Law Rev. 138, 35  Mod. Law Rev. 409.
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Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the trespasser 
category. The two higher categories allowed for some degree of 
flexibility in the face of social change. The judicial tendency has 
been to attem pt to minimize, if not eliminate, the distinction be­
tween the two as a considerable degree of judicial discretion has 
evolved behind the façades of the various classical formulae. The 
rule in A d d ie ’s case left virtually no room for recovery at all, 
much less for flexibility. The problem did not arise from the fact 
that society had grown to expect occupiers to make their land 
trespass-proof. On the contrary, common sense required that a 
man be entitled to presume his neighbours would normally obey 
the law. The obvious problem is that while one may normally 
presume others will obey the law, one may not always presume so. 
No reasonable person would suggest that he is entitled to assume 
that children will always obey the law. Yet that precise assumption 
is inherent in A d d ie ’s case.
In Herrington the House considered almost exclusively the 
problem of the innocent child trespasser. It is submitted that they 
did no more than verbalize the consequences as regards proximity 
and a corresponding duty of care entailed in an innocent act of 
trespass by a child; in other words, they determined what a reason­
able man would consider in ascertaining what he should or should 
not do. Their emphasis on the fact that they were not equating 
the position of lawful and unlawful entrants is perfectly rational. 
What is important in their decision is that the category of occupant 
is no longer the only relevant factor, that it may often be of mini­
mal importance where other factors are compelling enough. Simi­
larly, it is submitted that the test of “substantial probability” is, 
if anything, a relative test, dependant upon the circumstances of 
the case. It might be suggested that the ‘substantial probability’ of 
trespass need be just as high where a child stumbles into a pit 
filled with sulfuric acid, as where the same child enters upon land 
and stubs his toe. It is submitted, however, that such a suggestion 
would meet with little practical acceptance in our courts.
In Canada today when an injured trespasser comes before a 
court, that court is bound to determine what the occupier ought 
or ought not to have done to avoid that injury. W hatever words 
are used to document the analysis, there is only one method of 
determination and this is by asking what would be reasonable 
under the circumstances. The qualifications seen in some of the 
case law can serve no theoretical or practical purpose other than 
to indicate that that judge would normally consider the imposition 
of a higher standard of care to be unreasonable.
